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This study examines the origin of the gender wage gap and of its cross-country heterogeneity using unique harmonized 
international matched employer-employee microdata for nine representative European countries. Evidence obtained 
uncovers that female segregation into low-paying workplaces is by and large an outstanding origin of both the gender pay 
gap in every European economy and of international differences in its magnitude. Empirical results also suggest that, in 
contrast with the findings of previous comparative studies, international disparities in global structures, and particularly in 
wage dispersion, are not major determinants of inter-country differences in the size of the gender wage gap. Finally, also 
of concern is that an important diversity exists both in the size of the gender wage gap and in its underlying causes across 
transitional new members of the European Union. 
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The existence of a significant and persistent gap in earnings between males and females is a well-
documented stylized fact of modern labour markets. Furthermore, the size of the gap displays a 
significant variation across countries (see Blau and Kahn, 2003 and OECD, 2002 for detailed 
descriptive evidence). Provided that identifying the sources of gender differences in wages is crucial 
to implementing effective policy decisions in order to reduce them, the origin of the gap and of 
international differences in its magnitude has deserved considerable attention in the economic 
literature (for authoritatives reviews, see Altonji and Blank, 1999 and Blau and Kahn, 2000).  
Some regularities emerge from empirical studies on the origin of the gender gap in pay. 
Firstly, differences by gender in human capital endowments are not the main origin of the gender 
pay gap. Thus, differences in individual characteristics such as age, education and experience tend to 
play a relatively minor part in the explanation of the gap and, given the general improvement of 
educational situation and participation rates of females, these gender-specific differences in individual 
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characteristics tend in general to diminish over time (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005 and 
OECD, 2002). Secondly, the gender pay gap is strongly related to the segregation of women into 
low-wage structures. Earlier studies highlighted the detrimental effect on female wages arising from 
female segregation into low-paid occupations (see e.g. Groshen, 1991 and Macpherson and Hirsch, 
1995). More recent studies drawing on matched employer-employee data reveal that female 
segregation into low-wage workplaces play a particularly important negative impact on their relative 
wages (e.g., Bayard et al., 2003, Meng, 2004 and Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica, 2006) and also 
that international differences in the intensity of female workplace segregation could play a role in the 
explanation of international differences in the size of the gap (Simón and Russell, 2007). This type of 
female segregation is, furthermore, a phenomenon proving to be persistent in Europe, given that 
recent increase in female employment is achieved mainly into sectors of activity and professions 
which are already dominated by women (European Commission, 2007). Thirdly, current evidence 
suggests that the size of the gender pay gap is related to the global characteristics of the wage 
structure and, in particular, to the extent of wage dispersion. This link is explained by the fact that, as 
women are usually concentrated in the lower part of the wage structure, the more dispersed the 
structure prevailing in a country the greater the penalty for female wages. Accordingly, empirical 
evidence shows that gender wage gaps are generally higher in those countries with comparatively 
more dispersed wage structures (Blau and Kahn, 1992, 1996, 2003 and Simón and Russell, 2007) and, 
in a similar vein, that the evolution of wage dispersion over time is a significant determinant of the 
changes of the gender wage gap (Edin and Richardson, 2002 and Blau and Kahn, 1997, 2006). A 
final point of concern regarding overall existing international evidence on the gender wage gap is that 
it is illustrative of how cross-country comparative analyses have complemented more traditional 
within-country examinations of gender pay differentials and, thus, have led to additional compelling 
progress in this literature. 
This study is concerned with examining the origin of the gender pay gap and of international 
differences in its size in a wide set of European countries (specifically, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, Norway, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia and Lithuania). Despite long-standing 
equal pay and equal opportunity legislation, a significant gender gap in pay is generally observed in 
the European Union. Moreover, it exhibits a remarkable heterogeneity across its members (Eurostat, 
2005 and European Commission, 2006). As long as an examination across a number of 
representative European countries could provide a sounder empirical base for assessing the sources 
of the gender gap in earnings and of its international variation and consequent policy options, this 
sort of comparative analysis is particularly appealing. 
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The empirical study is carried out on the basis of the unique harmonized matched employer-
employee microdata drawn from the 2002 wave of the European Structure of Earnings Survey. This 
survey is conducted in all the members of the European Union plus some additional European 
countries according to a common methodology. A remarkable drawback of previous international 
comparative studies on the origin of the gender wage gap is that they are not based on appropriate 
international harmonized microdata, which implies that estimates of the gender pay gap may vary 
depending, inter alia, on the data available, the specific sample, year of analyses and the wage concept 
used.1 In contrast with previous related work, the comparative analysis in this study is based on a 
reliable cross-country harmonized pay data. In addition, it must also be stressed that previous 
comparative studies have been carried out with household-based microdata, which involve well-
known important restrictions when analyzing wages (namely a high risk of measurement error in 
wages and a usually rather limited information on key wage-determining characteristics of individuals 
and, very specially, of their workplaces and jobs). On the contrary, an outstanding feature of the 
European Structure of Earnings Survey is that it contains matched employer-employee data. Overall, 
this type of data has allowed fundamental advances in our understanding of wage determination (for 
reviews, see Abowd and Kramarz, 1999 and Haltiwanger et al., 1999). Nevertheless, international 
databases with matched data are extremely scarce and, for that reason, this sort of data has been used 
heretofore essentially in analyses for individual countries, despite their potential use for international 
comparisons. As far as we know, the only international matched employer-employee data currently 
available is, indeed, the European Structure of Earnings Survey. However, accessibility to their 
microdata has been traditionally highly constrained by data confidentiality.2 For that reason, the 
empirical comparative analysis in this study benefits particularly from the use of harmonized 
matched data with a variety of information on workers and their workplaces and jobs, which allow, 
consequently, to consider the influence on a gender wage gap of a wider set of factors than 
microdata coming from individual or household surveys.  
Countries covered by the study comprise ‘old’ and ‘new’ European Union members. 
Therefore, a particular purpose of the study is the analysis of the origin of the gender wage gap for 
transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Previous studies on the gender wage gap in 
                                                 
1  As far as we know, the only exception are international analysis of the sources of the gender gap in earnings for 
European countries provided drawing on comparable individual microdata from the European Community Household 
Panel (OECD 2002 and Eurostat, 2002). 
2 This survey has been used basically for descriptive analyses (e.g. Eurostat, 2005), with the exception of a number of 
international comparative studies carried out with the 1995 wave of the survey in the context of a project financed by the 
European Commission (5th framework project ‘Pay Inequalities and Economic Performance’; http://cep.lse.ac.uk/piep), 
under extremely restrictive conditions of access to the microdata (inter alia, Lallemand et al., 2007, Plasman et al., 2007, 
Simón and Russell and Simón, 2005). 
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countries in transition document a number of stylized facts (see Paci and Reilly, 2004 for a thorough 
review of the existing empirical work on the extent and trends of the gender wage gap during 
transition). First, the gender gap in pay in most transitional economies is relatively small, 
predominantly thanks to the comparatively high productivity endowments held by women in these 
countries. As a result, a large part of the total wage differential can only be explained in terms of 
gender differences in the returns workers receive to their characteristics. Second, in most countries 
the gender pay gap either remained stable or contracted during the transitional period, in spite of the 
fact that the increase in wage dispersion has acted to widen the gap in most cases. It should be 
stressed that an important lacuna in the current empirical literature consists of that the studies that 
have explicitly addressed the specific impact of occupational and/or workplace segregation on the 
gap in these countries are rather scarce. One of the main exceptions is the empirical work on the 
determinants of the gender pay gap in Slovakia and the Czech Republic based on employer-employee 
matched data in Jurajda (2003), whose findings suggest that a significant portion of the overall 
gender pay gap is attributable to workplace segregation in both countries.  
 An extension of the Juhn et al. (1991) wage decomposition methodology suggested by Blau 
and Kahn (1992) is employed in order to ascertain the origin of the gender wage gap and of its 
international differences. This technique permits to distinguish between the impact on the gender 
pay gap of gender-specific factors and of a country’s wage structure. The decomposition has been 
specifically adapted for its use with matched employer-employee data following the hints of Gartner 
and Stephan (2004). As a consequence, its application to international matched data allows to assess 
to what extent international differences in the gender wage gap are influenced by two workplace-
related factors, namely the intensity of female sorting into low-wage workplaces and the dispersion 
of workplace wage differentials. Let us notice that, aside the comparative evidence for four European 
countries in Simón and Russell (2007), the interesting concern wether the intensity of firm 
segregation by gender is an influential source of international differences in the gender gap in 
earnings has not been empirically tested to date. In a similar vein, there exists fragmentary evidence 
suggesting that the dispersion of inter-firm wage differentials could vary considerably across 
countries (Simón, 2005), which implies that there is empirical plausibility to the argument that 
international differences in the dispersion of these differentials may play a part in the explanation of 
differences in the gender wage gap across countries. Yet, this a largely unknown concern. 
The outline of the study is as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and presents summary 
statistics on the extent of wage dispersion and the magnitude of wage differentials by gender for our 
set of European countries. Section 3 describes the methodology used in the analysis. Section 4 
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examines the sources of the gender wage gap and of international differences in its size. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
In brief, obtained evidence uncovers several main findings. Firstly, the gender wage gap 
exhibits a remarkable heterogeneity across European countries. Second, female segregation into low-
paying workplaces is an outstanding origin of both the gender pay gap in all European economies 
and of international differences in its size, being segregation of females into workplaces with a high 
presence of female employees a factor with a particularly detrimental effect on relative wages of 
European females. Third, obtained evidence reveals that, in contrast with the findings of previous 
comparative studies, international disparities in global characteristics of the wage structure, and in 
particular in the extent of wage inequality, are not major determinants of inter-country differences in 
the size of the gender wage gap in Europe. In contrast, they are mainly driven by gender-specific 
factors. Finally, also of concern is that an important diversity exists both in the size of the gender 
wage gap and in its underlying causes across new members of the European Union. 
 
2. Data  
2.1. Data Source 
The microdata used in this study are drawn from the 2002 European Structure of Earnings 
Survey (ESES hereafter). This dataset is a collection of national surveys conducted in all member 
states of the European Union (as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) according to a standard 
methodology under the auspices of the Statistical Office of the European Communities. It provides 
detailed and comparable information on the level and structure of remuneration of employees, their 
individual characteristics and the enterprise or local unit to which they belong. This study draws on 
the 2002 national data samples for Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, 
Latvia, Slovakia and Lithuania a non-EU country, Norway. The ESES survey covers workplaces with 
more than 9 employees in sections C to O of the economic activity classification scheme NACE, 
except for Norway, Latvia, Italy and Portugal where sectors L, M, N and O (public administration, 
defence and compulsory social security; education; health and social work and other community, 
social and personal service activities) are not covered and Spain, where sector L is not covered.3 
Thus, industry coverage in these countries is narrower than elsewhere. Given that it does not 
comprise the public sector, partially or totally, and that wage differentials in European labour 
markets tend to be lower there than in the private sector (Arulampalam et al., 2004), its exclusion is 
                                                 
3 The national samples of Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Slovakia actually cover workplaces with less 
than 10 employees. In order to work with similar types of workplaces in all the countries, they have been dropped from 
the samples.  
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likely to inflate the size of the raw gender pay gap in these countries. On the other hand, the 
exclusion of small entreprises may affect the figures for southern countries in particular, given that a 
significant portion of total private employment in these countries corresponds to this segment of the 
labour market. 
A prominent feature of the ESES is that it consists of matched employer-employee data with 
a sample of workers at each workplace. The ESES collects information, usually provided by the 
management of the establishments, on demographic information for workers (earnings, sex, age, 
level of education, tenure in the firm, occupation, type of contract and full-time/part-time indicators) 
along with detailed information for each respondent’s establishment (industry, size and type of 
financial control).4 Additional features of workplace’s labour force composition can be derived from 
the observations of each establishment included in ESES. The analysis is restricted to individuals 
aged 18-64. The final national samples are in the range between 58,049 and 972,729 workers (for 
Portugal and the Czech Republic, respectively) and between 472 and 21,615 establishments (Slovakia 
and Spain) and the number of workers per firm in the sample is in the range between 8.8 and 831.2  
(Portugal and Slovakia). Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
The earnings measure used in the empirical analysis is the gross hourly wage. This implies 
that the goal of the research is to explain international differences in the gender gap of the price of 
labour rather than in labour incomes. In particular, earnings cover remuneration in cash paid by the 
employer before deductions for tax and employee social security contributions. They comprise all 
payments different from overtime pay, including commissions, travelling expenses, premium 
payments for shift, night and weekend work and all bonuses and allowances, regardless of whether 
or not they are paid regularly in each monthly pay period (thus, they also cover annual bonuses as 
holiday bonuses, 13th and 14th monthly salaries, profit sharing and allowances for leave not taken)5. 
Let us emphasize that the wage information in the ESES data has an important advantage in that the 
wage definition is exactly the same across countries.  
2.2. Descriptive Evidence 
 Table 1 documents the gender wage gap and wage dispersion for the countries in the sample. A 
large international heterogeneity in the magnitude of the wage gap is observed: the gap goes from 0.067 
                                                 
4 Information on the type of collective agreement covering the workplace is also available for some of the countries in 
the sample (Norway, Italy and the Netherlands are exceptions). Yet, due to the presence of different institutional wage-
settings and, consequently, types of collective agreements across countries it is troublesome to design proper common 
indicators to all the countries. Likewise, a variable regarding the main market of the firm is available only for a small 
subset of the countries in the sample. Consequently, information on type of collective agreement and the main market of 
the firm has not been used in subsequent empirical analyses.  
5 According to ESES 2002 data, bonuses paid annually in industry and services, respectively, represent between 1-3% of 
mean annual earnings in Norway and Lithuania, around 5-6% in Latvia and Italy, 9% in the Netherlands and between 14-
17% in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Portugal and Spain (Eurostat, 2005).  
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log points in Lithuania to 0.313 points in Slovakia.6 In order to put this evidence into a wider 
perspective, Table A.2 in the Appendix reports the hourly gender wage gap for the European Union-25 
countries plus Norway and Iceland. (Interestingly, evidence in Table A.2 is drawn from the same survey 
used in this study, the 2002 wave of the European Structure of Earnings Survey.)7 The gender wage gap 
exhibits a very important heterogeneity across Europe: the gap goes from 0.052 log points in Slovenia to 
0.329 in Slovakia. As can be observed, this heterogeneity is specially important as regards the new 
member states of Central and Eastern Europe, given that some of them (namely Slovenia, Poland and 
Lithuania) exhibit the lowest gender wage gaps in Europe, whereas other countries of this group, like 
Slovakia and Estonia, are among the countries with the highest gaps. Very interestingly, the countries 
embraced by this study cover almost the full range of heterogeneity in the gender wage gap in Europe. 
Hence, as noted before, the gender wage gap in Slovakia is the highest of the European Union, whereas 
that of Lithuania is in the lowest range of the EU countries (to be more precise, only Poland and 
Slovenia exhibit a lower gender wage gap than Lithuania). 
 Wage dispersion also shows a large heterogeneity across the countries in the sample. Thus, very 
dispersed wage structure are found in countries like Latvia (where the variance of log hourly wages is 
0.529 and the ninetieth-tenth percentile log wage differential is 1.786) and more compressed distribution 
are present in economies like Norway (0.136 and 0.891, respectively).8  When all the countries in the 
sample are considered, bivariate correlation between the size of the gender wage gap and wage 
dispersion is actually negative (although coefficients are non-significant at conventional levels) for all the 
dispersion measures. As a matter of fact, the two countries with lowest gaps in the sample, Lithuania 
and Latvia exhibit, indeed, comparatively very dispersed wage structures. In the same vein, the two 
economies with the highest gaps in the sample, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, are not in the upper 
range of wage inequality in the sample. Note, yet, that these four economies are new members of the 
European Union. When the analysis is constrained to old members of the European Union, a somewhat 
different picture emerges: bivariate correlation between the gender wage gap and wage dispersion is 
positive (although, again, coefficients are statistichally non-significant). All in all, these overall results 
constitute just mixed evidence on an association between the magnitude of the gender gap and wage 
dispersion in the case of European economies, in contrast with the findings of previous comparative 
studies, which support the link between wage inequality and the gender wage gap.  
 
                                                 
6 These gaps should be exponentiated in order to express the estimates as percentage mark-ups. 
7 This information is available in http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat. 
8 A thorough analysis with ESES matched data of the origin of international differences in wage inequality in European 




In evaluating the sources of international differences in the gender wage gap, the extension of 
the Juhn et al. (1991) decomposition suggested by Blau and Kahn (1992) is used. Let us notice that it 
has been specifically adapted for its use with matched employer-employee data, following the hints 
of Gartner and Stephan (2004). As a consequence, this version of the technique allows to consider 
the role of firm-related factors as an additional source of these gaps and their international 
discrepancies. 
The empirical analysis departs from the separate estimation for each country of the following 
wage function: 
       jijiij aεβXw ++=                                                   (1) 
where wij is the natural log of hourly wage of individual i in workplace j; Xi is a vector of individual 
and job characteristics; β is a vector of parameters to be estimated (including an intercept); εij is a 
stochastic error term and aj is an error component corresponding to workplace j and invariant for all 
the individuals working in the same workplace.9  
Equation (1) is estimated for the pool of workers in each country. Although the choice of the 
wage structure of the majority group as the reference structure in order to develop wage 
decompositions (e.g., using men as the reference group when addressing the gender wage gap) is 
largely a standard in the literature, we use the estimate from the pool of workers as the estimate of 
the wage structure that would exist in the absence of discrimination. There are several advantages to 
using a pooled approach obtained from a matrix combination of both the female and the male prices 
as the base for the decomposition. First, pooling the wage structures for all workers allows use of all 
the available information to estimate market wage returns and the joint wage structure also 
constitutes a more natural approximation to the labour market’s non-discriminatory wage structure 
than just adopting the structure of the main group or using other alternatives such as the wage 
structure of the minority group or a linear combination of the structures of both groups (Oaxaca and 
Ransom, 1994 and Neumark, 1988). Second, there are some methodological and computational 
advantages, since it makes unnecessary both the use of percentile ranks in the Juhn et al. (1991) 
decomposition, which can drive to problems of identification in the decomposition (see Suen, 
                                                 
9 Given that the workplace specific effects aj also capture unobservable individual effects common to all employees in a 
workplace and that it is not possible to identify this effect in ESES cross-section microdata, they are relegated to the 
residual. Existing evidence for several countries suggests that unobserved individual effects tend to be weakly 
uncorrelated with workplace specific effects (Goux and Maurin, 1999 and Abowd et al., 2001). 
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1997),10 and the requirement of the samples comprising two males and two females in every 
workplace in order to identify workplace effects in separate estimations of wage equations by gender. 
The result of the Hausman's contrast indicates that workplace specific effects are in all the 
countries correlated with the rest of the explanatory variables. Therefore, the use of random effects 
in the estimation would generate inconsistent estimations of the parameters of the equation and, 
hence, the aj‘s are estimated as fixed effects. Let us notice that the identification of the workplace 
effects is guaranteed given that there is more than one observation per workplace in all the national 
samples in our matched employer-employee dataset (thus, workplaces with less than two 
observations have been dropped from the samples). Equation (1) is thus estimated by fixed effects, 
which is equivalent to estimate by ordinary least squares with a set of workplace dummies.11 
Therefore, relying on the properties of the ordinary least squares estimator, after the estimation of 
equation (1) with the pooled data of country A and having obtained the values of Aβˆ , σA y ηA, the 
average wage of the subgroup of workers s (s=males or females) in country A can be expressed as:  






s ληθσβXw ++= ˆ        where )1,0(~Aθ , )1,0(~Aλ           (2) 
where the superscript A is for the country A (note that subscripts i and j have been omitted in the 
equation for ease of presentation); Asw  stands for the mean natural log of hourly wage of given group 
s; AsX  is a vector of the average of the set of explanatory variables for group s; 
A
sβˆ  is the vector of 
coefficients estimated with equation (1) and the pooled data of country A; σA is the standard 
deviation of wage residuals of the pool of workers; Asθ  is the average standardized residual of group 
s; ηA is the standard deviation of workplace effects of the pool of males and females and Asλ  is the 
average standardized workplace effect of group s. Let us notice that, as long as equation (1) is 
estimated for the pool of workers in the economy, neither As
Aθσ  nor As
Aλη  has to be zero for each 
separate group of workers. 
Using the pooled wage structure as the market price references in the decomposition, the 
wage gap between males and females in country A, DA, can be written as follows:  
                                                 
10 A recent assessment of the merits and shortcomings of the Juhn et al. (1991) decomposition can be found in Yun 
(2007). According to this author, the decomposition relies on a few strong assumptions difficult to verify.  
11 Unfortunately, ESES samples are restricted to employees and this precludes the treatment of selection bias into 
employment with the conventional econometric correction techniques à la Heckman (Heckman, 1979). We are aware of 
the potential bias of our estimates, since the econometric models do not account for this systematic selection of workers.   
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A ∆∆∆)()()( ++=++== ----         (3) 
where the subscript m is for males and f for females and a ∆ prefix denotes average difference 
between males and females in the subsequent variable.  
Equation (3) quantifies the extent to which average wage differences between males and 
females in country A are related to (a) differences in endowments of observed characteristics, (b) the 
influence of unobserved factors and (c) the influence of workplace-related factors. More specifically, 
the first term on the right side of the equation corresponds to the portion of the wage differential 
attributable to differences between the observed characteristics of the two groups )( Af
A
m XX - , valued 
at market prices ( Aβˆ ). That is to say that this term of the decomposition coincides with the 
‘explained’ component of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.12 
The second term measures the influence on the relative wages of males and females of the 
unobserved factors in the model. This component comprises the effect of unobserved ability, 
motivation and discrimination and corresponds to the impact of differences in the average 
standardized residual multiplied by the money value per unit difference in the standardized residual. 
Therefore, it is the product of the difference in average standardized wage residuals )( Af
A
m θθ - , which 
captures the average influence of unobserved factors, and the dispersion of the sample-wide 
distribution of wage residuals (σ A), which determines the specific wage penalty suffered by the group 
which is left comparatively disadvantaged by the effect of these factors. 
The third term in the right-hand side of equation (3) approximates the influence of 
workplaces on the gender wage differential. This term is taken as a product of the difference in the 
average standardised workplace effect of males and females )( Af
A
m γγ -  and the dispersion of the 
sample-wide effects distribution (ηA). Thus, the overall influence of workplaces on the gap depends 
on two factors. Firstly, to what extent males and females work in workplaces where different wages 
are paid to observationally similar workers (in other words, if one group of workers is segregated into 
comparatively low-wage workplaces). The magnitude of this phenomenon is captured by the 
difference in the two groups’ average standardised workplace effect. The second is the size of the 
dispersion of wage differentials across workplaces, which determines the extent of the wage penalty 
of the group which is relatively more segregated into low-wage firms. 
                                                 
12 It remains a matter of debate as to what controls should be included in wage equations when carrying out wage 
decompositions. Thus, the widest possible range of observed characteristics has been chosen for use in the analysis. 
These comprise occupation, for which the different levels of endowments/distributions for different groups of workers 
in an economy may be affected by discriminatory practices and, as a result, they would not simply reflect competitive 
wage differentials. For that reason, the first term of the decomposition cannot be labelled ‘non-discriminatory’, as it 
frequently is in the economic literature. 
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In the end, the difference in the magnitude of the gender wage gap between countries A and 
B may be expressed, after applying the decomposition in equation (3) twice, as the following (double) 
decomposition equation: 
 )(∆)∆∆((∆)∆∆()ˆˆ(∆ˆ)∆∆( BABABABABABABABABABA ηηληλλσσθσθθββXβXXDD --)----- +++++=         (4) 
By the accounting scheme in equation (4), international discrepancies in the magnitude of the 
gender wage gap can be explained by inter-country differences in six factors, each of them captured 
by the relevant term of the decomposition. The first term measures the effect of differences in the 
gap of observed characteristics of males and females. The second term reflects the contribution of 
differences in the market prices of observed characteristics. The third term measures the impact of 
inter-country differences in the relative positions of males and females within the residual wage 
distribution after controlling for measured characteristics and workplace effects. The fourth term 
isolates the impact of differences in wage residual dispersion holding the relative position of the 
average worker of each group in the residual distribution constant.13 The fifth term captures the 
impact of inter-country differences in the extent of workplace segregation of males and females. 
Finally, the sixth term measures the effect of differences in the dispersion of workplace wage 
differentials. 
 The components of the decomposition methodology can be further grouped into those 
attributable to worker-specific factors and those components related to the wage structure. 
Therefore, the first, third and fifth terms in equation (4) capture the role of inter-country deviations 
in the differences by gender in productivity characteristics, unobservable factors and workplace 
segregation. That is, they measure differences in the relative behaviour or treatment of males and 
females and are, therefore, worker-specific terms. The second, fourth and sixth terms in equation (3) 
measure the overall effect of  inter-country differences in the underlying wage structure. In 
particular, the fourth and sixth terms measure the effect of differences in wage inequality, as 
measured by residual wage inequality and the dispersion of workplace wage differentials. Instead, the 
first and second decomposition terms can be aggregated to assess the overall effect of observed 
characteristics in generating international differences in the gender wage gap; the third and fourth 
terms capture the overall influence of unobserved factors and the fifth and sixth decomposition 
terms assess the joint effect of workplace-related factors. 
 
                                                 
13 If inter-country differences in residual inequality were interpreted as differences in the market premium for unobserved 
skills, this component would represent the effect of differences in the returns to unobservable skills. However, this is 
quite a strong interpretation of residual inequality as it may also capture, inter alia, the effect of measurement errors, 




 Table 2 provides summary results of the within-country decomposition of the gender wage gap 
in the European countries in the sample, obtained after applying the extension of the Juhn et al. (1991) 
decomposition methodology suggested by Blau and Kahn (1992) and specifically adapted for its use 
with matched employer-employee data to the breakdown of international differences in wage 
differentials by gender. This information has been drawn after the separate estimation of the wage 
equation (1) for each country in our sample.14 It comprises evidence on the dispersion of residual wages 
and workplace wage differentials (as measured by the standard deviation of standardized wage residuals 
and workplace effects, respectively) and on the average position of men and women in both 
distributions. Final column reports the (unweighted) average values for the nine countries. 
 It is observed that, conditioning on measurable characteristics and on workplace effects, the 
average wage residual is positive for males and negative for females in every European labour market. 
Consequently, the average female position in the residual distribution is always well below the median 
(on average, they are in the percentile 44) and the average male position is above it (percentile 59). This 
result suggests that unobserved factors are systematically detrimental for female wages. Yet, some 
international differences can be found as regards the importance of this phenomenon. Thus, the 
negative impact of unobserved factors on female wages seems to be particularly important in Italy, Spain 
and the Czech Republic (the mean female wage residual in these countries is of -0.238, -0.236 and -
0.204, respectively, compared to an average for the nine countries of -0.167) and less severe in Latvia, 
Lithuania and the Netherlands (-0.076, -0.080 and -0.086). International differences in residual wage 
inequality, which determines the specific wage penalty of unobserved factors on female wages, exists as 
well: the average standard residual deviation for the nine countries is of 0.276, but it ranges between 
0.212 (Italy) and 0.349 (Latvia).  
 In the same vein, in all the economies in the sample the average male workplace effect is 
positive, whereas the average female workplace effect is largely negative (average values for the nine 
countries are 0.137 and -0.179, respectively). This result reflects a general female segregation into low-
paying workplaces all across Europe. However, significant differences in this concern are also to be 
found across countries. Therefore, female segregation is comparatively more intense in Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic and Spain (the mean female workplace in these countries is of -0.325, -0.261 and -0.237, 
respectively) and significantly less important in Norway (-0.126), Lithuania (-0.119) and, very specially, 
Latvia (-0.051). International differences in workplace effects inequality, which determines the specific 
wage penalty on female wages of this type of segregation, are also observed: the average standard 
                                                 
14 The estimated earning functions are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The general econometric results are fairly 
standard, so we do not discuss them. 
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deviation of workplace effects ranges between 0.568 (Latvia) and 0.126 (Norway), with an average of 
0.294.  
 Overall, descriptive evidence reveals that the effect on females wages of both unobserved 
elements and workplace-related factors is without exception unfavourable in all European economies. 
Yet, it also shows that their impact is far from being homogeneous across European labour markets 
and, as a consequence, that they are potential sources of international differences in the size of the 
gender wage gap. An additional point of concern is that cross-country differences in these issues are 
particularly important between the new members of the European Union, which suggests the existence 
of a significant diversity into this group of countries. 
 Table 3 contains the results of separate within-country decompositions of the gender wage gap 
according to the three terms shown in equation (3). The results of the breakdown of inter-country 
differences in the gap according to equation (4) are reported, in turn, in Tables 5 (summary results) and 
6 (full results of pairwise country comparisons). This overall evidence has been obtained after the 
separate estimation for each country of a fully specified wage equation (1). In order to ensure cross-
country comparability of the results, the specification of the wage equation is the same for all countries. 
Thus, wage regressions comprise individual and job controls and workplace effects. In particular, 
individual controls consist of a set of traditional human capital variables that proxy productivity 
endowments: the highest level of education reached by the individual (six levels are considered); age and 
its squared term (as a proxy for experience) and the time spent with the current employer and its 
squared term. Job controls consist of dummies for 27 major occupational groups and indicators for a 
permanent contract and a full-time job. 
The results of the breakdown of the gender gap in each country (Table 3) shows, firstly, that 
differences in measured characteristics of males and females account, on average, for 0.046 log 
points of the gender wage gap, which amounts to 22.7% of a total gap of 0.202 points. The impact 
on the gap of gender differences in measured qualifications is not, in particular, very remarkable: 
overall differences in education, age and tenure explain just 0.014 log points (or 6.9%) of the total 
gap. In turn, job characteristics are a more significant source (0.033 points), being the bulk of this 
effect explained by female occupational segregation (0.025 and 12.4%). Overall, in line with 
previously available evidence, these findings confirm that differences by gender in observed 
productive characteristics are in general a minor source of the gap in earnings in every European 
country. Furthermore, they suggest that occupational segregation is a more important origin of the 
gap than differences between males and females in productivity-related characteristics. 
Nevertheless, average results uncover in some cases a remarkable heterogeneity across 
countries. Thus, as regards the impact on the gap of gender differences in productivity individual 
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characteristics, in contrast with average results, it is quite significant in the Netherlands (where it 
explains 0.061 points, or 26.4%, of a total gap of 0.231) and is, indeed, beneficial for female wages in 
Latvia (-0.012) and Lithuania (-0.036), where females are better educated than men and they have 
longer tenure and total work experience (as proxied by age). This last country constitutes the only 
case where female are actually sorted into high-paying occupations (so that this factor would 
diminish ceteris paribus the wage gap in Lithuania in 0.055 log points), which contrasts with Norway 
and Portugal, where occupational segregation is particularly harmful for females wages, being the 
origin of a gap in the order of 0.07 log points in both cases. 
Obtained evidence reveals, in addition, that gender differences in wage residuals are a 
relevant source of the gender wage gap: the second term of the breakdown accounts on average for 
0.071 log points (35.2%) of the total average gap. This result uncovers that in all European countries 
there exist significant average within-workplace wage differentials between observationally similar 
men and women doing the same type of jobs. This suggests that women are regarded by European 
employers as having a lower unobservable productivity component than their male counterparts 
and/or their observable productivity characteristics are treated as having lower value. Again, some 
differences are to be found between countries (as a matter of fact, the importance of this 
phenomenon is particularly important in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the two countries in the 
sample with the highest gaps), although it should be noted that in every European country, including 
transitional new members of the European Union, unobserved factors are detrimental for female 
wages. 
Gender differences in firm location are, in turn, an outstanding source of the gender wage 
gap in all nine countries. The third term of the breakdown has an average effect of 0.085 log points 
(42.1% of the total average gap), which implies that, overall, this factor is comparatively the most 
important origin of the gender pay gap. The negative impact on female wages of female segregation 
into low-wage labour structures is still more clean-cut when occupational and workplace segregation 
are aggregated: 54.4% of the total average gap is explained by this factor. Yet, let us notice that 
although workplace segregation is systematically prejudicial for female wages in every European 
economy, a significant cross-country heterogeneity is also observed in this case, including the new 
members state of the European Union of Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, for instance, the 
penalty wage associated to workplace segregation is less significant for females in Norway (0.025) 
and Latvia (0.051), but it is particularly important for those in the Czech Republic (0.117) and, very 
specially, Slovakia (0.160). 
In order to ascertain the attributes of low-wage workplaces in which European women are 
over-represented, Table 4 contains the results of within-country decompositions of the gap with an 
 15
 
alternative specification of the model of wage determination, in which workplace effects have been 
substituted by workplace characteristics. The attributes included are indicators for industry (55 
dummies); the type of financial control (a dummy for a fully publicly owned firms); size (five 
dummies) and a set of characteristics of the workplace workforce (specifically, the ratio to all 
employees in the workplace of women, low- and high-educated workers -as defined as those workers 
with lower than upper-secondary and with tertiary education, respectively- and the average age and 
tenure).15 These characteristics almost entirely capture the effect of workplace effects on the sex 
wage gap: they account for 0.090 points of the gap, compared to 0.085 with the specification of the 
wage equation with workplace effects. In short, this alternative evidence reveals that the segregation 
of females into workplaces with a high presence of female employees is, with some minor exception, 
the factor with the most detrimental effect on female relative wages, with an average explanatory 
power of the gap of 0.068 points and a comparatively more severe effect in Spain (0.093), Slovakia 
(0.100) and the Czech Republic.16 
Table 5 displays the average results of pairwise decompositions of cross-country differences 
in the gender wage gap, as expressed by equation (4), with the wage structure of country A and 
country B weights used as the base.17 For each pair of countries the comparison where the difference 
in wage inequality is positive has been considered (the total amount of comparisons is 36). 
These pair inter-country comparisons reveal that gender-specific components play an 
outstanding role in explaining differences in the gender wage gap between European countries: these 
factors explain 0.086 points of a total average difference of 0.091. Thus, in countries with higher gaps 
the relative endowments of observed characteristics are comparatively detrimental for female wages 
(with an average effect of 0.030); the residual gap (0.015) is also relatively disadvantageous for 
females (so that the impact of unobserved characteristics and/or of labour market discrimination 
against women is especially harmful for their wages) and, very specially, the negative impact of 
workplace segregation on female wages is considerably more intense (0.041). 
                                                 
15 Many of these firm characteristics are usual controls in empirical analysis on wage determination. Yet, let us notice 
that, in particular, the set of characteristics of the firm workforce has been included providing the evidence that the 
average human capital endowment of a firm’s workforce affects the individual wages of all its workers, due to human 
capital externalities, such as productive complementarities and knowledge diffusion (Battu et al., 2003) and that a higher 
presence of women in a firm depresses overall wages (Bayard et al., 2003 and Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica, 2006). 
According to the economic theory, the disproportionate location of females in low-wage labour structures depresses 
wages due to a ‘crowding’ effect, namely the oversupply of labour in those structures (Sorensen, 1990). 
16 The estimated coefficient of the female share is negative and highly significant in every country (Table A.1 of the 
Appendix). According to the economic theory, the disproportionate location of females in low-wage labour structures 
depresses wages due to a ‘crowding’ effect, namely the oversupply of labour in those structures (Sorensen, 1990).  
17 Given that the decomposition is subject to the well-known index number problem, decomposition outcomes could in 
some cases be sensitive to the choice of references in the comparison. To avoid this problem we use different benchmark 




On the other hand, differences in wage structures play in general a comparatively minor 
influence in shaping international differences in the size of the gender wage gap. Thus, although 
female wages in countries with lower wage gaps tend to be favoured by global wage structure 
characteristics, this factor explains just 0.005 points of a total average difference of 0.091. Also of 
concern, wage inequality (whose influence is more properly approximated by the joint effect of 
residual wage inequality and the dispersion of workplace wage differentials) plays an almost negligible 
opposite influence: had the high-gap countries the same wage inequality than low-gap economies, 
their gender pay gap would actually increase by 0.007 log points.  
These conclusions hold also from the specific results of the pairwise comparisons of low- 
and high-gap countries. Thus, in the case of Latvia and Lithuania, the two countries with the lowest 
gaps in the sample, gender-specific factors are the main explanation of their comparatively low gaps, 
given that their very dispersed wage structures would originate ceteris paribus comparatively higher 
gaps in these countries. In the same vein, gender-specific factors play in general an outstanding part 
in the explanation of the lower gap in low-gap countries. Therefore, they are by far the main origin 
of the comparatively lower gap in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic (altough the results for 
Slovakia are more mixed). 
In order to ascertain to what extent average results mask a different relationship between the 
gender wage gap and wage inequality in old and new members of the European Union, second and 
third columns of Table 5 contain the average results of the decomposition when the new members 
of the European Union are excluded of the examinations. Therefore, when just Lithuania and Latvia 
are excluded (second column) a new picture apparently emerges: gender-specific and wage structure 
components explain, in turn, 0.032 and 0.028 points of a total average difference of 0.060. Yet, when 
all the new members are eliminated from the comparative analysis, main conclusions of the general 
analysis hold. Thus, gender-specific terms explain the bulk of international differences in the size of 
the gender gap (0.037 point compared to 0.036). On the contrary, although differences in wage 
inequality components play a part in the explanation (0.013), total wage structure characteristics are 
comparatively less important (-0.001). Therefore, overall obtained evidence seems to suggest, in 
contrast with the findings of earlier studies that wage structure characteristics are prominent in 
explaining pair-country differences in the magnitude of the sex wage gap, that this conclusion can 







This study has examined the origin of international differences in the gender wage gap in 
Europe. Despite long-standing equal pay and equal opportunity legislation, a significant gender gap 
in pay is generally observed in European Union members. Our analysis for a number of 
representative European economies has permited to obtain a full range of comparative empirical 
evidence that sheds light on the origin of the gender wage gap and of its significant international 
heterogeneity across European countries. This is relevant insomuch identifying the sources of sex 
differences in wages is crucial to implementing effective policy decisions in order to reduce gender 
differences in pay. 
 The empirical research has been conducted on the basis of microdata drawn from a unique 
harmonized international matched employer-employee dataset, the European Structure of Earnings 
Survey. This survey, which includes a rich array of key determinants of earnings that comprise 
workplace-related factors, is an excellent source of strictly comparable data to address these questions in 
a comprehensive fashion. In short, this database has two important advantages relative to previous 
international comparative studies, which allow for highly unparalleled examination of the sources of the 
sex wage gap. Firstly, it consists of inter-country harmonized microdata, so that international 
comparisons are developed on a strictly comparable basis. Secondly, it constitutes a unique harmonized 
international matched employer-employee dataset with linked information on both worker and 
workplace characteristics. Therefore, it allows for novel empirical insights into the reasons why the 
gender pay gap exist and differs substantially across countries. In practice, its use provides a full range of 
empirical evidence that permits a sounder empirical base for assessing the sources of the gender gap in 
earnings and consequent policy options. 
Obtained evidence confirms previous findings in the gender-related literature that differences 
in individual productivity-related characteristics play in general a minor role in the explanation of the 
gender pay gap. All in all, female segregation into low-wage structures emerges as the main 
contributor to the gender pay gap, with female segregation into low-wage workplaces as an 
outstanding origin of both the gender pay gap in all European economies and of international 
differences in its size. Interestingly, this result extends also to new members of the European Union, 
in which this theme has been traditionally under-researched. Although it should be taken into 
account that some degree of gender segregation could be plausibly optimal for both men and 
women, in case they differ in their preferences about non-labour activities and jobs non-pecuniary 
attributes or in socialization patterns, these findings support potential attempts to enforce an equal 
distribution of men and women across occupations and workplaces through equal treatment 
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legislation, affirmative action or other means (for more details on potential policy responses, see 
European Commission, 2006). Furthermore, the result that segregation of females into workplaces 
with a high presence of female employees is a factor with a particularly detrimental effect on their 
relative wages suggests that particular attention should be given to the low level of wages in labour 
structures which tend to be dominated by females. Policy initiatives aimed at improving the 
remuneration of female-dominated jobs might comprise, inter alia, the development and application 
of gender-neutral systems of job evaluation. 
On the other hand, obtained evidence reveals that, in contrast with the findings of previous 
comparative studies, international disparities in global characteristics of the wage structure, and in 
particular in the extent of wage inequality, are not major determinants of inter-country differences in 
the size of the gender wage gap in Europe. This result reveals that the generalization of the 
conclusions of earlier analyses covering different countries is not straightforward. Moreover, it 
suggests that policy initiatives adopting a mainstreaming or multi-dimensional approach that includes 
potential changes of institutional factors like wage formation systems with the aim of influencing the 
wage structure might not be central in order to reduce the gender pay gap. 
A final point of concern is that cross-country differences in the origin and the magnitude of 
the gender gap in pay are particularly significant between the new members of the European Union, 
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Gender wage gap and wage dispersion. ESES 2002. 
 Lithuania Latvia Italy Norway Portugal Spain Netherlands 
Czech 
Republic Slovakia 
Log hourly wage gap 0.067  0.130 0.163 0.204 0.222 0.229 0.231 0.261 0.313 
Hourly wage dispersion          
Variance of logarithms 0.385  0.529 0.175 0.136 0.376 0.274 0.254 0.196 0.252 
90-10 log differential 1.591  1.786 1.002 0.891 1.545 1.289 1.139 1.060 1.190 
Gini Index 0.367  0.456 0.252 0.217 0.376 0.315 0.262 0.263 0.308 






Within-country decomposition of the gender wage gap. Summary statistics. ESES 2002. 
 Lithuania Latvia Italy Norway Portugal Spain Netherlands Czech Republic Slovakia Average 
Gender wage gap  0.067  0.130  0.162  0.204  0.222  0.229  0.231  0.261  0.313  0.202 
Mean female residual  -0.080 -0.076 -0.238 -0.181 -0.150 -0.204 -0.086 -0.236 -0.167 -0.158 
Mean male residual   0.094  0.058  0.111  0.104  0.092  0.112  0.088  0.205  0.143  0.112 
Female mean residual percentile 46 46 41 43 45 42 47 40 43 44 
Male mean residual percentile 56 55 65 59 58 60 57 62 59 59 
Residual standard deviation  0.341  0.349  0.212  0.216  0.266  0.242  0.281  0.244  0.331  0.276 
Mean female workplace effect -0.119 -0.051 -0.180 -0.126 -0.138 -0.237 -0.172 -0.261 -0.325 -0.179 
Mean male workplace effect   0.140  0.039  0.084  0.072  0.084  0.129  0.177  0.227  0.278  0.137 
Female mean workplace effect percentile 52 54 44 53 50 43 41 43 42 47 
Male mean workplace effect percentile 62 57 61 61 67 59 58 63 63 61 




Within-country decomposition of the gender wage gap. ESES 2002. 
 Lithuania Latvia Italy Norway Portugal Spain Netherlands Czech Republic Slovakia Average 
Gender wage gap 0.067 0.130 0.162 0.204 0.222  0.229  0.231  0.261 0.313 0.202 
Observed characteristics (1)  -0.089(-133.3) 0.033(25.2) 0.023(14.0)  0.117(57.5) 0.082(37.0)  0.040(17.3)  0.124(53.7)  0.037(14.0) 0.050(16.0) 0.046(22.7)
Individual characteristics -0.036 -0.012  0.017  0.023  0.017   0.026   0.061  0.016  0.011  0.014 
Education -0.016 -0.007 -0.006 0.006 -0.009 -0.008 0.013 0.011 0.009 -0.001
Age -0.003 -0.002  0.017  0.014  0.017  0.013  0.032 -0.001  0.000  0.010 
Tenure  -0.017 -0.003  0.006  0.003  0.009  0.021  0.017  0.006  0.002  0.005 
Job characteristics -0.053  0.045  0.006  0.094  0.065   0.014   0.063  0.020  0.039  0.033 
Type of contract -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.007  0.003 -0.003  0.001 
Full-time/Part-time  0.003 -0.001  0.000  0.023 -0.008 -0.003  0.034  0.000  0.008  0.006 
Occupation -0.055  0.046  0.005  0.070  0.072  0.014  0.022  0.017  0.034  0.025 
Wage residuals (2) 0.059(88.7) 0.047(35.7) 0.074(45.5)  0.062(30.2) 0.064(28.9)  0.076(33.3)  0.049(21.1)  0.108(41.2) 0.103(32.8) 0.071(35.2)
Workplace effects (3) 0.097(144.6) 0.051(39.0) 0.066(40.5)  0.025(12.3) 0.076(34.1)  0.113(49.4)  0.059(25.5)  0.117(44.8) 0.160(51.2) 0.085(42.1)









Within-country decomposition of the gender wage gap. Alternative specification with workplace characteristics. ESES 2002. 
 Lithuania Latvia Italy Norway Portugal Spain Netherlands Czech Republic Slovakia Average 
Gender wage gap 0.067 0.130 0.162 0.204 0.222 0.229 0.231 0.261 0.313 0.202 
Observed characteristics (1)  0.009(13.4) 0.082(63.2) 0.083(51.0) 0.148(72.5) 0.157(70.7) 0.150(65.4) 0.181(78.4) 0.151(57.9) 0.219(69.9) 0.131(64.9)
Individual characteristics -0.036 -0.011  0.017  0.022  0.017  0.028  0.061  0.017  0.010  0.014 
Education -0.018 -0.008 -0.006 0.005 -0.009 -0.005 0.013 0.012 0.009 -0.001
Age -0.001  0.000  0.017  0.013  0.017  0.012  0.032  0.000  0.000  0.010 
Tenure  -0.017 -0.003  0.006  0.003  0.009  0.021  0.017  0.006  0.001  0.005 
Job characteristics -0.055  0.052  0.002  0.068  0.064  0.010  0.061  0.024  0.015  0.027 
Type of contract  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.008  0.003 -0.001  0.002 
Full-time/Part-time  0.006  0.006 -0.004  0.018 -0.008 -0.002  0.032  0.000  0.006  0.006 
Occupation -0.061  0.045  0.005  0.049  0.071  0.010  0.021  0.021  0.009  0.019 
Workplace characteristics  0.100  0.041  0.063  0.058  0.076  0.112  0.059  0.111  0.194  0.090 
Industry   0.101  0.015  0.017  0.021  0.027  0.038 -0.012  0.039  0.097  0.038 
Type of financial control -0.032 -0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.017 -0.003  0.010 -0.001 
Size -0.005 -0.007  0.000  0.000 -0.008 -0.014  0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 
Female share  0.065  0.039  0.046  0.034  0.060  0.093  0.053  0.118  0.100  0.068 
Average age  0.005 -0.005  0.000  0.004  0.006  0.003  0.000 -0.017 -0.006 -0.001 
Average tenure -0.008  0.000  0.002 -0.002 -0.003  0.005  0.004 -0.010 -0.003 -0.002 
Share of high-educated -0.026 -0.004 -0.001  0.000 -0.001 -0.006  0.000 -0.015 -0.005 -0.006 
Share of low-educated  0.001  0.003 -0.002  0.001 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002  0.001  0.001 -0.001 
Wage residuals (2) 0.058(86.4) 0.048(36.8) 0.080(49.0) 0.056(27.4) 0.065(29.3) 0.079(34.7) 0.051(21.9) 0.110(42.1) 0.094(30.1) 0.071(35.1)
Workplace effects (3) - - - - - - - - - - 




Decomposition of inter-country differences in the  











DA-DB  0.091  0.060  0.036 
    
Gap in observed characteristics (1)  0.030 -0.013  0.033 
Market prices for observed characteristics (2)  0.013  0.009 -0.014 
Wage residual gap (3)  0.015 -0.001 -0.015 
Wage residual standard deviation (4)  0.003  0.015  0.010 
Gap in workplace effects (5)  0.041  0.046  0.020 
Workplace effects standard deviation (6) -0.010  0.004  0.003 
    
Characteristics (1)+(2)  0.042 -0.004  0.018 
Wage residuals (3)+(4)  0.017  0.015 -0.005 
Workplace effects (5)+(6)  0.032  0.050  0.023 
    
Worker-specific components (1)+(3)+(5)  0.086  0.032  0.037 
Wage structure components (2)+(4)+(6)  0.005  0.028 -0.001 
    
Wage inequality (4)+(6) -0.007  0.019  0.013 
Notes:: The average values in the table have been calculated from all the pairwise comparisons of 
the nine countries in the sample.  Regressions include workplace fixed effects and individual and 
job controls (education, age and its squared term, tenure in the firm and its squared term, type of 








Decomposition of inter-country differences in the gender wage gap. Full results. ESES 2002. 







DLithuania-DOther country - -0.063 -0.096 -0.137 -0.155 -0.162 -0.164 -0.194 -0.246 -0.152 -0.152 - 
Gap in observed characteristics (1) - -0.144 -0.152 -0.216 -0.156 -0.123 -0.194 -0.135 -0.121 -0.155 -0.155 - 
Market prices for observed characteristics (2) -  0.022  0.040  0.009 -0.015 -0.006 -0.019  0.009 -0.018  0.003  0.003 - 
Wage residual gap (3) -  0.014 -0.060 -0.038 -0.023 -0.048  0.000 -0.091 -0.046 -0.037 -0.037 - 
Wage residual standard deviation (4) - -0.001  0.045  0.036  0.018  0.031  0.010  0.043  0.003  0.023  0.023 - 
Gap in workplace effects (5) -  0.063 -0.002  0.023  0.014 -0.040 -0.034 -0.085 -0.129 -0.024 -0.024 - 
Workplace effects standard deviation (6) - -0.017  0.033  0.049  0.007  0.023  0.071  0.065  0.065  0.037  0.037 - 
Characteristics (1)+(2) - -0.122 -0.112 -0.207 -0.171 -0.129 -0.213 -0.126 -0.139 -0.152 -0.152 - 
Wage residuals (3)+(4) -  0.013 -0.015 -0.002 -0.005 -0.017  0.011 -0.048 -0.043 -0.013 -0.013 - 
Workplace effects (5)+(6) -  0.046  0.031  0.072  0.021 -0.017  0.038 -0.020 -0.064  0.013  0.013 - 
Worker-specific components (1)+(3)+(5) - -0.067 -0.213 -0.231 -0.165 -0.212 -0.227 -0.311 -0.296 -0.215 -0.215 - 
Wage structure components (2)+(4)+(6) -  0.003  0.117  0.094  0.010  0.049  0.062  0.117  0.050  0.063  0.063 - 
Wage inequality (4)+(6) - -0.018  0.078  0.085  0.025  0.055  0.082  0.108  0.068  0.060  0.060 - 







DLatvia-DOther country  0.063 - -0.032 -0.074 -0.091 -0.099 -0.101 -0.131 -0.183 -0.081 -0.102  0.063 
Gap in observed characteristics (1)  0.067 -  0.001 -0.053 -0.020 -0.025 -0.038  0.000  0.005 -0.008 -0.019  0.067 
Market prices for observed characteristics (2)  0.055 -  0.009 -0.032 -0.029  0.018 -0.054 -0.004 -0.022 -0.007 -0.016  0.055 
Wage residual gap (3) -0.014 - -0.075 -0.053 -0.037 -0.064 -0.014 -0.107 -0.061 -0.053 -0.059 -0.014 
Wage residual standard deviation (4)  0.001 -  0.048  0.038  0.020  0.034  0.012  0.046  0.005  0.026  0.029  0.001 
Gap in workplace effects (5) -0.096 - -0.099 -0.061 -0.075 -0.157 -0.147 -0.226 -0.292 -0.144 -0.151 -0.096 
Workplace effects standard deviation (6)  0.050 -  0.084  0.087  0.050  0.094  0.139  0.160  0.182  0.106  0.114  0.050 
Characteristics (1)+(2)  0.122 -  0.010 -0.084 -0.049 -0.007 -0.091 -0.004 -0.017 -0.015 -0.035  0.122 
Wage residuals (3)+(4) -0.013 - -0.027 -0.015 -0.018 -0.030 -0.002 -0.061 -0.056 -0.028 -0.030 -0.013 
Workplace effects (5)+(6) -0.046 - -0.015  0.026 -0.025 -0.062 -0.008 -0.066 -0.109 -0.038 -0.037 -0.046 
Worker-specific components (1)+(3)+(5) -0.043 - -0.173 -0.167 -0.133 -0.245 -0.199 -0.333 -0.348 -0.205 -0.228 -0.043 
Wage structure components (2)+(4)+(6)  0.107 -  0.140  0.094  0.041  0.146  0.097  0.202  0.165  0.124  0.126  0.107 
Wage inequality (4)+(6)  0.052 -  0.131  0.125  0.070  0.128  0.151  0.206  0.188  0.131  0.143  0.052 







DItaly-DOther country  0.096  0.032 - -0.042 -0.059 -0.067 -0.069 -0.099 -0.151 -0.045 -0.081  0.064 
Gap in observed characteristics (1)  0.050 -0.040 - -0.064 -0.082  0.025 -0.073 -0.013 -0.023 -0.028 -0.038  0.005 
Market prices for observed characteristics (2)  0.062  0.030 - -0.031  0.023 -0.042 -0.028 -0.001 -0.005  0.001 -0.014  0.046 
Wage residual gap (3)  0.037  0.046 -  0.014  0.023  0.007  0.037 -0.020  0.008  0.019  0.012  0.042 
Wage residual standard deviation (4) -0.022 -0.018 - -0.001 -0.013 -0.009 -0.012 -0.014 -0.037 -0.016 -0.014 -0.020 
Gap in workplace effects (5)  0.001  0.043 -  0.016  0.010 -0.026 -0.021 -0.056 -0.085 -0.015 -0.027  0.022 
Workplace effects standard deviation (6) -0.032 -0.028 -  0.025 -0.020 -0.022  0.028  0.005 -0.009 -0.007  0.001 -0.030 
Observed characteristics (1)+(2)  0.112 -0.010 - -0.095 -0.059 -0.017 -0.101 -0.014 -0.027 -0.026 -0.052  0.051 
Wage residuals (3)+(4)  0.015  0.027 -  0.012  0.010 -0.002  0.025 -0.034 -0.029  0.003 -0.003  0.021 
Workplace effects (5)+(6) -0.031  0.015 -  0.041 -0.010 -0.047  0.007 -0.051 -0.094 -0.021 -0.026 -0.008 
Worker-specific components (1)+(3)+(5)  0.089  0.049 - -0.034 -0.049  0.006 -0.057 -0.088 -0.099 -0.023 -0.054  0.069 
Wage structure components (2)+(4)+(6)  0.007 -0.017 - -0.007 -0.011 -0.073 -0.012 -0.010 -0.051 -0.022 -0.027 -0.005 
Wage inequality (4)+(6) -0.054 -0.047 -  0.023 -0.033 -0.031  0.016 -0.009 -0.046 -0.023 -0.013 -0.051 
Reference: Norway Lithuania Latvia Italy Norway Portugal Spain Netherlands Czech Slovakia Average Average when Average when 
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DNorway-DOther country  0.137  0.074  0.042 - -0.018 -0.025 -0.027 -0.057 -0.109  0.002 -0.047  0.084 
Gap in observed characteristics (1)  0.140  0.098  0.058 -  0.061   0.071 -0.025   0.075  0.082  0.070  0.053  0.099 
Market prices for observed characteristics (2)  0.066 -0.013  0.037 - -0.026   0.007   0.019   0.006 -0.015  0.010 -0.002  0.030 
Wage residual gap (3)  0.024  0.033 -0.014 -  0.009 -0.007   0.024 -0.034 -0.005  0.004 -0.003  0.014 
Wage residual standard deviation (4) -0.022 -0.018  0.001 - -0.012 -0.008 -0.010 -0.012 -0.036 -0.015 -0.016 -0.013 
Gap in workplace effects (5) -0.008  0.014 -0.008 - -0.003 -0.021 -0.019 -0.036 -0.051 -0.017 -0.026 -0.001 
Workplace effects standard deviation (6) -0.064 -0.040 -0.033 - -0.048 -0.067 -0.015 -0.056 -0.084 -0.051 -0.054 -0.046 
Characteristics (1)+(2)  0.207  0.084  0.095 -  0.035   0.078 -0.007   0.081  0.067  0.080  0.051  0.129 
Wage residuals (3)+(4)  0.002  0.015 -0.012 - -0.003 -0.015   0.013 -0.046 -0.041 -0.011 -0.018  0.002 
Workplace effects (5)+(6) -0.072 -0.026 -0.041 - -0.051 -0.088 -0.034 -0.092 -0.135 -0.067 -0.080 -0.046 
Worker-specific components (1)+(3)+(5)  0.157  0.144  0.036 -  0.067   0.043 -0.020   0.005  0.026  0.057  0.024  0.112 
Wage structure components (2)+(4)+(6) -0.020 -0.071  0.006 - -0.085 -0.069 -0.008 -0.062 -0.135 -0.056 -0.072 -0.028 
Wage inequality (4)+(6) -0.086 -0.057 -0.031 - -0.060 -0.075 -0.026 -0.068 -0.120 -0.065 -0.070 -0.058 







DPortugal-DOther country  0.155  0.091  0.059  0.018 - -0.007 -0.009 -0.039 -0.091  0.022 -0.037  0.081 
Gap in observed characteristics (1)  0.171  0.081  0.088  0.071 -  0.105  0.117  0.091  0.096  0.103  0.102  0.103 
Market prices for observed characteristics (2)  0.001 -0.032 -0.029 -0.106 - -0.063 -0.159 -0.045 -0.064 -0.062 -0.083 -0.042 
Wage residual gap (3)  0.018  0.029 -0.029 -0.012 - -0.020  0.018 -0.053 -0.018 -0.008 -0.018  0.002 
Wage residual standard deviation (4) -0.013 -0.011  0.019  0.014 -  0.008 -0.003  0.010 -0.020  0.001 -0.001  0.002 
Gap in workplace effects (5) -0.013  0.045 -0.014  0.008 - -0.049 -0.043 -0.090 -0.130 -0.036 -0.078  0.007 
Workplace effects standard deviation (6) -0.009 -0.020  0.024  0.042 -  0.011  0.060  0.049  0.045  0.025  0.041  0.009 
Characteristics (1)+(2)  0.171  0.049  0.059 -0.035 -  0.042 -0.042  0.045  0.032  0.040  0.019  0.061 
Wage residuals (3)+(4)  0.005  0.018 -0.010  0.003 - -0.012  0.016 -0.043 -0.038 -0.008 -0.019  0.004 
Workplace effects (5)+(6) -0.021  0.025  0.010  0.051 - -0.038  0.017 -0.041 -0.085 -0.010 -0.037  0.016 
Worker-specific components (1)+(3)+(5)  0.176  0.155  0.045  0.068 -  0.036  0.092 -0.053 -0.052  0.058  0.006  0.111 
Wage structure components (2)+(4)+(6) -0.021 -0.063  0.014 -0.050 - -0.044 -0.102  0.013 -0.039 -0.037 -0.043 -0.030 
Wage inequality (4)+(6) -0.022 -0.031  0.043  0.057 -  0.019  0.057  0.059  0.025  0.026  0.040  0.012 







DSpain-DOther country  0.162  0.099  0.067   0.025  0.007 - -0.002 -0.032 -0.084  0.046 -0.084  0.072 
Gap in observed characteristics (1)  0.111  0.017 -0.017 -0.059 -0.036 - -0.059   0.005  0.025  0.007  0.025  0.003 
Market prices for observed characteristics (2)  0.018 -0.010  0.034 -0.019 -0.006 - -0.025 -0.002 -0.035 -0.003 -0.035  0.003 
Wage residual gap (3)  0.034  0.044 -0.008   0.007  0.018 -   0.034 -0.030  0.001  0.016  0.001  0.019 
Wage residual standard deviation (4) -0.017 -0.014  0.010   0.007 -0.006 - -0.007 -0.001 -0.028 -0.008 -0.028 -0.004 
Gap in workplace effects (5)  0.033  0.086  0.032   0.052  0.045 -   0.005 -0.038 -0.073  0.029 -0.073  0.050 
Workplace effects standard deviation (6) -0.017 -0.023  0.016   0.036 -0.007 -   0.049   0.034  0.026  0.005  0.026  0.001 
Observed characteristics (1)+(2)  0.129  0.007  0.017 -0.078 -0.042 - -0.084   0.003 -0.010  0.004 -0.010  0.007 
Wage residuals (3)+(4)  0.017  0.030  0.002   0.015  0.012 -   0.028 -0.031 -0.026  0.008 -0.026  0.015 
Workplace effects (5)+(6)  0.017  0.062  0.047   0.088  0.038 -   0.054 -0.004 -0.047  0.034 -0.047  0.050 
Worker-specific components (1)+(3)+(5)  0.178  0.146  0.007   0.000  0.027 - -0.020 -0.062 -0.047  0.052 -0.047  0.072 
Wage structure components (2)+(4)+(6) -0.016 -0.047  0.060   0.025 -0.019 -   0.017   0.031 -0.037 -0.006 -0.037  0.001 
Wage inequality (4)+(6) -0.034 -0.037  0.026   0.044 -0.013 -   0.042   0.033 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 







DNetherlands-DOther country  0.164  0.101  0.069   0.027  0.009   0.002 - -0.030 -0.082  0.048 -0.082  0.074 
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Gap in observed characteristics (1)  0.213  0.142  0.075   0.030  0.085   0.105 -   0.107  0.125  0.112  0.125  0.109 
Market prices for observed characteristics (2)  0.000 -0.051  0.026 -0.023 -0.043 -0.021 - -0.019 -0.051 -0.024 -0.051 -0.018 
Wage residual gap (3)  0.000  0.011 -0.049 -0.030 -0.019 -0.040 - -0.075 -0.038 -0.021 -0.038 -0.017 
Wage residual standard deviation (4) -0.010 -0.009  0.024   0.018  0.004   0.012 -   0.016 -0.016  0.002 -0.016  0.005 
Gap in workplace effects (5)  0.015  0.044  0.014   0.026  0.021 -0.003 - -0.023 -0.043  0.013 -0.043  0.024 
Workplace effects standard deviation (6) -0.053 -0.036 -0.021   0.009 -0.038 -0.051 - -0.035 -0.058 -0.033 -0.058 -0.028 
Characteristics (1)+(2)  0.213  0.091  0.101   0.007  0.042   0.084 -   0.088  0.074  0.088  0.074  0.091 
Wage residuals (3)+(4) -0.011  0.002 -0.025 -0.013 -0.016 -0.028 - -0.059 -0.054 -0.020 -0.054 -0.013 
Workplace effects (5)+(6) -0.038  0.008 -0.007   0.034 -0.017 -0.054 - -0.058 -0.101 -0.020 -0.101 -0.004 
Worker-specific components (1)+(3)+(5)  0.228  0.197  0.040   0.024  0.088   0.062 -   0.007  0.044  0.104  0.044  0.115 
Wage structure components (2)+(4)+(6) -0.063 -0.096  0.029   0.004 -0.078 -0.060 - -0.037 -0.125 -0.055 -0.125 -0.041 
Wage inequality (4)+(6) -0.063 -0.045  0.003   0.027 -0.035 -0.039 - -0.018 -0.074 -0.031 -0.074 -0.023 







DCzech Republic-DOther country  0.194  0.131  0.099   0.057  0.039   0.032   0.030 - -0.052  0.078 -0.052  0.104 
Gap in observed characteristics (1)  0.090 -0.002 -0.003 -0.078 -0.032   0.009 -0.045 -  0.017 -0.001  0.017 -0.005 
Market prices for observed characteristics (2)  0.036  0.006  0.017 -0.003 -0.014 -0.013 -0.042 - -0.030  0.002 -0.030  0.008 
Wage residual gap (3)  0.065  0.075  0.023   0.038  0.049   0.031   0.065 -  0.032  0.047  0.032  0.050 
Wage residual standard deviation (4) -0.017 -0.014  0.011   0.008 -0.005   0.001 -0.006 - -0.027 -0.007 -0.027 -0.003 
Gap in workplace effects (5)  0.055  0.095  0.054   0.069  0.064   0.029   0.033 - -0.028  0.052 -0.028  0.067 
Workplace effects standard deviation (6) -0.035 -0.029 -0.003   0.023 -0.022 -0.025   0.025 - -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 
Characteristics (1)+(2)  0.126  0.004  0.014 -0.081 -0.045 -0.003 -0.088 - -0.014  0.001 -0.014  0.004 
Wage residuals (3)+(4)  0.048  0.061  0.034   0.046  0.043   0.031   0.059 -  0.005  0.040  0.005  0.046 
Workplace effects (5)+(6)  0.020  0.066  0.051   0.092  0.041   0.004   0.058 - -0.043  0.038 -0.043  0.054 
Worker-specific components (1)+(3)+(5)  0.210  0.168  0.073   0.029  0.081   0.069   0.053 -  0.021  0.097  0.021  0.112 
Wage structure components (2)+(4)+(6) -0.015 -0.038  0.025   0.028 -0.042 -0.037 -0.023 - -0.073 -0.019 -0.073 -0.008 
Wage inequality (4)+(6) -0.052 -0.043  0.009   0.030 -0.028 -0.025   0.018 - -0.043 -0.021 -0.043 -0.017 







DSlovakia-DOther country  0.246  0.183  0.151  0.109  0.091  0.084  0.082  0.052 -  0.125 -  0.125 
Gap in observed characteristics (1)  0.084 -0.005 -0.037 -0.116 -0.070 -0.050 -0.132 -0.011 - -0.042 - -0.042 
Market prices for observed characteristics (2)  0.056  0.023  0.064  0.049  0.038  0.061  0.058  0.025 -  0.047 -  0.047 
Wage residual gap (3)  0.045  0.058 -0.013  0.008  0.023 -0.002  0.045 -0.044 -  0.015 -  0.015 
Wage residual standard deviation (4) -0.002 -0.002  0.042  0.033  0.016  0.028  0.009  0.039 -  0.020 -  0.020 
Gap in workplace effects (5)  0.091  0.136  0.090  0.108  0.101  0.063  0.068  0.031 -  0.086 -  0.086 
Workplace effects standard deviation (6) -0.028 -0.027  0.004  0.028 -0.017 -0.016  0.034  0.012 - -0.001 - -0.001 
Characteristics (1)+(2)  0.139  0.017  0.027 -0.067 -0.032  0.010 -0.074  0.014 -  0.004 -  0.004 
Wage residuals (3)+(4)  0.043  0.056  0.029  0.041  0.038  0.026  0.054 -0.005 -  0.035 -  0.035 
Workplace effects (5)+(6)  0.064  0.109  0.094  0.135  0.085  0.047  0.101  0.043 -  0.085 -  0.085 
Worker-specific components (1)+(3)+(5)  0.220  0.189  0.041  0.000  0.054  0.011 -0.020 -0.024 -  0.059 -  0.059 
Wage structure components (2)+(4)+(6)  0.026 -0.007  0.110  0.110  0.037  0.073  0.101  0.076 -  0.066 -  0.066 
Wage inequality (4)+(6) -0.030 -0.029  0.046  0.060 -0.001  0.012  0.042  0.051 -  0.019 -  0.019 







Table A.1  
Descriptive evidence and regression results. 




































Age 40.361 41.120 0.003 39.493 39.422 -0.001 39.945 37.730 0.021 39.779 38.133 0.029 38.757 35.948 0.029 38.456 36.056 0.016 41.017 38.007 0.060 41.141 40.573 0.012 40.129 39.525 0.016 
Age*age 1759.4 1800.3 0.000 1704.7 1682.2 0.000 1687.7 1510.0 0.000 1722.5 1608.8 0.000 1630.1 1397.3 0.000 1599.4 1402.9 0.000 1811.5 1567.2 -0.001 1827.0 1766.8 0.000 1726.5 1659.0 0.000 
Tenure 5.861 8.407 0.014 3.673 4.003 0.029 11.694 10.346 0.011 7.841 6.598 0.006 10.011 8.732 0.018 8.616 6.314 0.017 9.662 5.754 0.010 11.350 9.225 0.011 11.600 10.700 0.012 
Tenure*tenure 90.51 145.93 0.000 39.94 48.44 -0.001 242.97 210.69 0.000 144.38 110.17 0.000 198.60 161.26 0.000 176.45 110.16 0.000 198.05 81.817 0.000 257.11 175.57 0.000 250.01 211.32 0.000 
Primary education 0.008 0.005 Refer. 0.004 0.002 Refer. 0.077 0.062 Refer. 0.040 0.037 Refer. 0.524 0.478 0.486 0.285 0.210 Refer. 0.085 0.079 -0.497 0.002 0.004 Refer. 0.000 0.000 Refer. 
Lower secondary education 0.080 0.039 0.021 0.128 0.071 -0.036 0.428 0.365 0.048 0.103 0.118 -0.038 0.192 0.172 0.120 0.300 0.256 0.003 0.171 0.184 0.076 0.084 0.146 -0.014 0.062 0.124 - 
Upper secondary education 0.397 0.271 0.045 0.306 0.329 -0.011 0.384 0.466 0.125 0.600 0.633 0.008 0.187 0.234 0.129 0.157 0.204 0.025 0.372 0.416 0.172 0.737 0.695 0.075 0.739 0.692 0.098 
Post-secondary education 0.176 0.219 0.070 0.361 0.350 0.003 0.019 0.017 0.144 0.039 0.032 0.041 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 -0.085 0.048 0.050 0.218 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 
Tertiary education 0.334 0.463 0.175 0.197 0.245 0.137 0.086 0.084 0.222 0.212 0.178 0.125 0.096 0.117 0.265 0.254 0.327 0.053 0.316 0.269 0.385 0.166 0.149 0.295 0.195 0.182 0.269 
Postgraduate 0.006 0.003 0.441 0.004 0.003 0.233 0.007 0.005 0.275 0.005 0.002 0.213 0.000 0.000 - 0.003 0.003 0.062 0.007 0.002 0.646 0.010 0.006 0.514 0.004 0.002 0.531 
Fixed-term 0.094 0.079 -0.025 0.070 0.060 0.047 0.033 0.045 -0.055 0.021 0.035 -0.048 0.188 0.200 -0.058 0.244 0.286 -0.069 0.131 0.211 -0.095 0.112 0.145 -0.097 0.107 0.084 -0.030 
Indefinite duration 0.906 0.921 Refer. 0.930 0.940 Refer. 0.967 0.955 Refer. 0.979 0.965 Refer. 0.812 0.800 1.058 0.756 0.714 Refer. 0.869 0.789 1.095 0.888 0.855 Refer. 0.893 0.916 Refer. 
Part-time 0.115 0.152 -0.160 0.101 0.144 -0.150 0.053 0.245 0.019 0.093 0.406 -0.058 0.006 0.031 0.326 0.044 0.207 0.014 0.196 0.758 -0.057 0.069 0.136 0.000 0.012 0.062 -0.116 
Full-time 0.886 0.848 Refer. 0.899 0.856 Refer. 0.947 0.755 Refer. 0.907 0.594 Refer. 0.994 0.969 0.674 0.956 0.793 Refer. 0.804 0.242 1.057 0.931 0.864 Refer. 0.988 0.938 Refer. 
Isco 11 0.009 0.006 Refer. 0.000 0.000 Refer. 0.001 0.000 Refer. 0.000 0.000 Refer. 0.000 0.000 1.779 0.000 0.000 Refer. 0.004 0.001 8.757 0.004 0.005 Refer. 0.001 0.001 Refer. 
Isco 12 0.112 0.075 -0.325 0.089 0.061 -0.435 0.017 0.004 0.136 0.081 0.036 0.089 0.035 0.022 0.634 0.029 0.011 -0.182 0.101 0.031 -0.045 0.044 0.024 0.326 0.039 0.023 -0.043 
Isco 13 0.000 0.000 - 0.026 0.011 -0.484 0.003 0.001 0.089 0.012 0.010 -0.095 0.000 0.000 0.470 0.000 0.000 - 0.021 0.011 -0.133 0.006 0.011 -0.011 0.005 0.006 -0.366 
Isco 21 0.037 0.018 -0.582 0.038 0.023 -0.675 0.004 0.001 -0.028 0.060 0.026 -0.174 0.030 0.015 0.430 0.038 0.014 -0.432 0.063 0.009 -0.153 0.039 0.010 -0.138 0.037 0.013 -0.446 
Isco 22 0.013 0.030 -0.466 0.001 0.011 -0.761 0.000 0.000 -0.211 0.001 0.002 -0.105 0.001 0.002 0.361 0.016 0.048 -0.423 0.016 0.031 -0.080 0.013 0.016 -0.015 0.013 0.019 -0.127 
Isco 23 0.036 0.136 0.008 0.000 0.001 -0.611 0.001 0.000 -0.077 0.000 0.000 -0.360 0.000 0.000 0.314 0.020 0.053 -0.410 0.075 0.096 -0.188 0.015 0.017 -0.096 0.011 0.025 -0.388 
Isco 24 0.043 0.094 -0.554 0.027 0.091 -0.563 0.001 0.001 -0.063 0.026 0.031 -0.145 0.014 0.019 0.294 0.019 0.032 -0.485 0.080 0.068 -0.153 0.031 0.058 -0.174 0.024 0.049 -0.538 
Isco 31 0.025 0.012 -0.687 0.043 0.025 -0.747 0.040 0.015 -0.657 0.097 0.024 -0.235 0.059 0.025 0.085 0.058 0.025 -0.708 0.066 0.014 -0.252 0.121 0.047 -0.170 0.107 0.047 -0.595 
Isco 32 0.002 0.073 -0.805 0.001 0.010 -0.559 0.002 0.002 -0.721 0.002 0.006 -0.329 0.001 0.001 0.049 0.002 0.007 -0.817 0.015 0.126 -0.208 0.003 0.103 -0.179 0.006 0.132 -0.484 
Isco 33 0.001 0.021 -0.263 0.000 0.001 -0.664 0.032 0.025 -0.632 0.000 0.000 -0.251 0.000 0.001 -0.107 0.001 0.004 -0.855 0.000 0.001 -0.376 0.002 0.004 -0.084 0.002 0.004 -0.486 
Isco 34 0.055 0.069 -0.707 0.050 0.071 -0.710 0.023 0.008 -0.718 0.078 0.133 -0.287 0.086 0.062 0.188 0.083 0.121 -0.727 0.084 0.094 -0.270 0.043 0.165 -0.234 0.032 0.113 -0.603 
Isco 41 0.017 0.064 -0.888 0.032 0.129 -0.860 0.269 0.483 -0.766 0.102 0.174 -0.446 0.130 0.242 -0.152 0.061 0.121 -0.962 0.078 0.120 -0.354 0.023 0.084 -0.420 0.020 0.078 -0.779 
Isco 42 0.004 0.019 -0.972 0.005 0.026 -0.934 0.000 0.000 - 0.009 0.050 -0.430 0.017 0.035 -0.245 0.016 0.062 -0.959 0.009 0.056 -0.391 0.004 0.048 -0.429 0.005 0.050 -0.812 
Isco 51 0.059 0.069 -0.939 0.048 0.062 -1.019 0.011 0.016 -0.792 0.034 0.080 -0.426 0.024 0.047 -0.231 0.047 0.120 -0.994 0.041 0.103 -0.327 0.043 0.051 -0.517 0.036 0.051 -0.859 
Isco 52 0.019 0.043 -0.918 0.035 0.178 -0.948 0.071 0.100 -0.816 0.060 0.215 -0.395 0.027 0.055 -0.254 0.021 0.064 -0.899 0.020 0.040 -0.349 0.006 0.041 -0.512 0.006 0.047 -0.759 
Isco 61 0.001 0.000 -1.012 0.003 0.002 -1.028 0.038 0.014 -0.872 0.001 0.000 -0.447 0.000 0.000 -0.237 0.003 0.000 -1.089 0.016 0.003 -0.417 0.001 0.001 -0.503 0.001 0.001 -0.902 
Isco 71 0.121 0.006 -0.850 0.092 0.008 -0.886 0.040 0.008 -0.856 0.056 0.001 -0.374 0.075 0.003 -0.188 0.096 0.004 -0.916 0.032 0.000 -0.361 0.061 0.001 -0.379 0.067 0.002 -0.723 
Isco 72 0.129 0.007 -0.748 0.144 0.008 -0.778 0.150 0.050 -0.884 0.101 0.004 -0.368 0.138 0.022 -0.141 0.103 0.006 -0.898 0.049 0.002 -0.357 0.223 0.044 -0.340 0.210 0.022 -0.710 
Isco 73 0.003 0.003 -0.887 0.005 0.007 -0.969 0.018 0.011 -0.882 0.004 0.004 -0.335 0.011 0.014 -0.291 0.008 0.006 -0.971 0.004 0.001 -0.320 0.010 0.018 -0.430 0.007 0.009 -0.713 
Isco 74 0.019 0.042 -0.882 0.055 0.097 -0.917 0.060 0.081 -0.916 0.016 0.011 -0.408 0.041 0.155 -0.325 0.022 0.025 -1.004 0.005 0.003 -0.343 0.014 0.035 -0.464 0.014 0.070 -0.809 
Isco 81 0.034 0.006 -0.842 0.050 0.010 -0.857 0.016 0.003 -0.819 0.058 0.012 -0.323 0.038 0.011 -0.206 0.041 0.004 -0.912 0.013 0.001 -0.268 0.086 0.024 -0.351 0.104 0.029 -0.697 
Isco 82 0.031 0.077 -0.798 0.028 0.033 -0.778 0.091 0.069 -0.915 0.059 0.047 -0.418 0.084 0.107 -0.258 0.132 0.096 -0.966 0.025 0.007 -0.368 0.058 0.098 -0.407 0.058 0.091 -0.768 
Isco 83 0.136 0.005 -0.813 0.141 0.006 -0.841 0.000 0.000 - 0.056 0.004 -0.449 0.090 0.002 -0.178 0.083 0.003 -0.932 0.037 0.003 -0.352 0.102 0.015 -0.377 0.140 0.018 -0.679 
Isco 91 0.059 0.114 -1.128 0.029 0.103 -1.118 0.057 0.069 -0.933 0.020 0.082 -0.474 0.031 0.093 -0.418 0.030 0.133 -1.112 0.042 0.068 -0.458 0.015 0.046 -0.643 0.018 0.055 -1.001 
Isco 92 0.000 0.002 -1.015 0.001 0.001 -0.885 0.000 0.001 -0.862 0.000 0.001 -0.436 0.000 0.000 - 0.001 0.000 -1.070 0.000 0.000 -0.465 0.000 0.000 -0.617 0.000 0.000 -1.191 
Isco 93 0.034 0.009 -0.965 0.059 0.027 -0.867 0.053 0.038 -0.899 0.022 0.010 -0.458 0.069 0.067 -0.372 0.074 0.042 -1.034 0.032 0.013 -0.400 0.034 0.035 -0.567 0.038 0.042 -0.857 
Isco 99 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.043 0.036 -0.335 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.069 0.098 -0.369 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 
Size 10-49 -0.151 -0.387 Refer. 0.315 0.313 Refer. 0.230 0.254 Refer. 0.033 0.053 Refer. 0.114 0.074 0.185 0.252 0.146 Refer. -0.407 -0.642 0.999 -0.317 -0.436 Refer. -0.276 -0.427 Refer. 
Size 50-249 0.439 0.451 0.156 0.441 0.392 0.200 0.202 0.207 0.099 0.267 0.238 0.027 0.316 0.327 0.113 0.295 0.262 0.105 0.161 0.144 0.009 0.105 0.095 0.065 0.130 0.120 0.029 
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Size 250-499 0.120 0.117 0.236 0.054 0.072 0.407 0.155 0.157 0.157 0.146 0.137 0.033 0.100 0.109 0.206 0.099 0.093 0.157 0.129 0.150 0.014 0.123 0.119 0.081 0.118 0.114 0.085 
Size 500-999 0.091 0.088 0.287 0.023 0.040 0.389 0.115 0.108 0.189 0.129 0.124 0.033 0.106 0.083 0.219 0.081 0.096 0.191 0.116 0.094 0.016 0.162 0.162 0.102 0.189 0.242 0.129 
Size>999 0.119 0.135 0.308 0.050 0.058 0.408 0.231 0.232 0.182 0.294 0.313 0.043 0.202 0.245 0.233 0.201 0.276 0.201 0.568 0.585 0.032 0.598 0.612 0.128 0.541 0.503 0.147 
Publicly owned firm 0.383 0.595 0.153 0.117 0.125 0.128 0.067 0.042 0.022 0.130 0.134 -0.042 0.161 0.162 0.044 0.072 0.126 -0.004 0.433 0.669 -0.071 0.329 0.447 0.029 0.298 0.448 -0.068 
Other type of control 0.617 0.405 Refer. 0.883 0.875 Refer. 0.933 0.958 Refer. 0.870 0.866 Refer. 0.839 0.838 0.956 0.928 0.874 Refer. 0.567 0.331 1.071 0.671 0.553 Refer. 0.702 0.552 Refer. 
Nace division 10 0.003 0.001 0.113 0.008 0.003 0.381 0.000 0.000 -0.261 0.001 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.000 - 0.005 0.000 0.356 0.000 0.000 - 0.053 0.008 0.280 0.009 0.001 0.210 
Nace division 11 0.001 0.000 1.041 0.000 0.000 - 0.001 0.000 0.367 0.045 0.019 0.263 0.000 0.000 - 0.001 0.000 0.367 0.003 0.000 0.304 0.000 0.000 -0.026 0.008 0.002 0.342 
Nace division 12 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 -0.032 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.005 0.002 0.133 0.000 0.000 - 
Nace division 13 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.001 0.000 0.041 0.004 0.000 0.241 0.001 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.004 0.001 0.030 
Nace division 14 0.004 0.001 0.288 0.002 0.001 0.468 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.004 0.001 0.011 0.015 0.004 0.197 0.016 0.003 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.001 0.000 0.234 0.001 0.000 0.166 
Nace division 15 0.053 0.052 0.002 0.055 0.093 0.042 0.038 0.045 0.025 0.059 0.057 -0.059 0.047 0.055 0.027 0.048 0.048 -0.062 0.020 0.005 0.063 0.031 0.036 0.072 0.035 0.038 0.049 
Nace division 16 0.001 0.000 1.022 0.000 0.000 - 0.001 0.001 -0.018 0.001 0.001 -0.040 0.001 0.001 0.022 0.001 0.002 0.051 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.536 0.001 0.001 0.442 
Nace division 17 0.012 0.022 0.101 0.007 0.021 0.087 0.023 0.045 -0.041 0.003 0.005 -0.111 0.036 0.066 -0.176 0.011 0.017 -0.173 0.002 0.001 -0.033 0.019 0.041 0.081 0.010 0.029 -0.074 
Nace division 18 0.009 0.068 -0.073 0.004 0.050 0.050 0.006 0.043 -0.083 0.000 0.002 -0.162 0.007 0.102 -0.146 0.005 0.031 -0.168 0.000 0.000 -0.067 0.002 0.015 0.019 0.009 0.063 -0.152 
Nace division 19 0.002 0.004 -0.058 0.002 0.003 -0.054 0.011 0.023 -0.090 0.000 0.001 -0.080 0.014 0.031 -0.064 0.011 0.013 -0.114 0.000 0.000 -0.050 0.001 0.004 0.094 0.005 0.020 -0.163 
Nace division 20 0.032 0.007 -0.100 0.084 0.027 -0.062 0.019 0.012 -0.119 0.016 0.006 -0.163 0.029 0.019 -0.005 0.028 0.009 -0.156 0.001 0.000 -0.078 0.006 0.003 0.044 0.010 0.004 -0.098 
Nace division 21 0.005 0.002 0.220 0.005 0.005 -0.010 0.020 0.015 0.041 0.016 0.006 -0.094 0.027 0.014 0.181 0.013 0.005 -0.016 0.006 0.000 0.067 0.008 0.005 0.155 0.017 0.008 0.326 
Nace division 22 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.013 0.027 0.091 0.019 0.020 0.079 0.019 0.021 -0.003 0.019 0.020 0.139 0.020 0.018 0.001 0.010 0.007 0.083 0.002 0.003 0.205 0.007 0.008 0.092 
Nace division 23 0.002 0.001 0.825 0.000 0.000 - 0.011 0.004 0.139 0.002 0.001 0.114 0.000 0.000 - 0.005 0.001 0.363 0.003 0.000 0.212 0.004 0.001 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.659 
Nace division 24 0.006 0.004 0.187 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.041 0.034 0.057 0.022 0.016 -0.022 0.018 0.014 0.222 0.031 0.023 0.094 0.023 0.006 0.082 0.019 0.012 0.106 0.032 0.025 0.169 
Nace division 25 0.011 0.003 0.045 0.010 0.006 -0.020 0.029 0.023 0.001 0.007 0.003 -0.090 0.017 0.015 0.039 0.028 0.015 -0.022 0.005 0.001 -0.006 0.025 0.015 0.164 0.022 0.010 0.285 
Nace division 26 0.014 0.004 0.105 0.014 0.008 0.196 0.043 0.027 0.029 0.013 0.005 -0.066 0.044 0.025 0.125 0.045 0.011 -0.020 0.005 0.000 -0.019 0.040 0.027 0.135 0.027 0.016 0.157 
Nace division 27 0.003 0.001 0.082 0.004 0.001 0.173 0.034 0.010 0.051 0.025 0.007 -0.017 0.016 0.005 0.000 0.014 0.002 0.030 0.008 0.000 -0.060 0.057 0.016 0.183 0.087 0.027 0.424 
Nace division 28 0.019 0.003 -0.097 0.028 0.010 0.098 0.035 0.017 -0.007 0.014 0.004 -0.089 0.043 0.023 0.030 0.050 0.011 -0.052 0.009 0.001 -0.058 0.027 0.013 0.042 0.032 0.009 0.118 
Nace division 29 0.017 0.005 -0.004 0.018 0.007 -0.011 0.076 0.040 0.019 0.021 0.007 -0.039 0.039 0.023 0.030 0.038 0.010 -0.058 0.013 0.002 -0.037 0.074 0.028 -0.021 0.043 0.015 0.050 
Nace division 30 0.001 0.000 -0.364 0.000 0.000 0.180 0.006 0.007 -0.011 0.001 0.000 -0.090 0.000 0.000 - 0.001 0.000 -0.183 0.002 0.001 -0.132 0.002 0.002 -0.205 0.002 0.001 0.040 
Nace division 31 0.004 0.004 0.139 0.005 0.006 0.141 0.029 0.025 -0.024 0.010 0.005 -0.039 0.019 0.024 0.039 0.028 0.014 -0.067 0.005 0.001 -0.056 0.028 0.033 0.047 0.028 0.051 0.009 
Nace division 32 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.090 0.018 0.021 -0.015 0.006 0.006 -0.097 0.011 0.020 -0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.047 0.019 0.005 -0.065 0.010 0.016 0.026 0.010 0.014 -0.062 
Nace division 33 0.005 0.003 0.057 0.003 0.003 -0.053 0.017 0.017 -0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.019 0.005 0.007 0.099 0.003 0.003 -0.050 0.004 0.001 -0.147 0.007 0.009 -0.029 0.004 0.003 0.212 
Nace division 34 0.001 0.000 -0.040 0.003 0.001 0.054 0.043 0.022 0.029 0.009 0.003 -0.068 0.032 0.023 0.090 0.028 0.013 -0.011 0.007 0.001 -0.036 0.062 0.035 0.196 0.051 0.008 0.184 
Nace division 35 0.014 0.003 0.232 0.010 0.003 0.039 0.023 0.011 -0.034 0.037 0.008 -0.050 0.018 0.004 0.007 0.013 0.003 -0.033 0.007 0.001 -0.016 0.015 0.005 0.037 0.010 0.003 0.099 
Nace division 36 0.022 0.009 -0.037 0.024 0.014 0.023 0.021 0.025 -0.117 0.008 0.008 -0.045 0.015 0.018 -0.023 0.029 0.015 -0.122 0.041 0.014 -0.166 0.011 0.013 0.063 0.004 0.005 0.148 
Nace division 37 0.003 0.001 -0.089 0.002 0.001 -0.030 0.006 0.004 -0.009 0.001 0.000 -0.036 0.002 0.001 0.158 0.001 0.000 -0.120 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.085 0.001 0.001 0.048 
Nace division 40 0.033 0.009 0.046 0.032 0.016 0.164 0.023 0.009 0.063 0.027 0.011 -0.099 0.021 0.006 0.346 0.016 0.004 0.108 0.011 0.002 0.096 0.040 0.016 0.215 0.042 0.015 0.478 
Nace division 41 0.014 0.004 -0.050 0.002 0.001 0.113 0.007 0.004 0.093 0.000 0.000 - 0.007 0.003 0.114 0.013 0.005 -0.025 0.002 0.001 0.063 0.017 0.008 0.064 0.027 0.009 0.234 
Nace division 45 0.142 0.017 Refer. 0.149 0.038 Refer. 0.034 0.010 Refer. 0.098 0.015 Refer. 0.095 0.015 -3.486 0.104 0.014 Refer. 0.038 0.003 0.743 0.054 0.009 Refer. 0.051 0.009 Refer. 
Nace division 50 0.033 0.009 -0.091 0.044 0.025 -0.007 0.020 0.012 0.006 0.030 0.011 -0.044 0.038 0.018 0.043 0.011 0.004 -0.081 0.010 0.002 -0.076 0.005 0.002 0.112 0.006 0.002 0.319 
Nace division 51 0.052 0.022 -0.010 0.114 0.099 0.074 0.033 0.035 0.006 0.082 0.057 -0.022 0.044 0.040 0.031 0.032 0.032 -0.061 0.038 0.013 -0.005 0.009 0.010 0.063 0.017 0.019 0.062 
Nace division 52 0.026 0.060 -0.115 0.070 0.235 -0.111 0.031 0.087 -0.085 0.060 0.239 -0.107 0.018 0.047 -0.125 0.029 0.081 -0.075 0.048 0.088 -0.130 0.019 0.072 -0.073 0.012 0.055 0.080 
Nace division 55 0.008 0.017 -0.085 0.012 0.043 0.110 0.017 0.035 -0.129 0.035 0.094 -0.029 0.031 0.073 0.028 0.037 0.084 -0.020 0.005 0.010 -0.127 0.006 0.014 0.061 0.003 0.004 0.067 
Nace division 60 0.062 0.017 -0.141 0.070 0.028 -0.032 0.048 0.012 -0.059 0.044 0.015 -0.060 0.052 0.006 0.055 0.040 0.009 -0.040 0.024 0.006 -0.016 0.106 0.036 0.139 0.191 0.068 0.158 
Nace division 61 0.005 0.001 0.228 0.001 0.000 0.421 0.006 0.004 0.127 0.022 0.011 -0.032 0.004 0.001 0.274 0.002 0.000 0.094 0.001 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.000 - 0.001 0.001 0.303 
Nace division 62 0.002 0.001 0.277 0.002 0.001 0.217 0.003 0.004 0.290 0.018 0.023 0.135 0.017 0.018 0.336 0.002 0.002 0.225 0.008 0.005 0.096 0.005 0.004 0.483 0.001 0.000 0.336 
Nace division 63 0.018 0.007 0.219 0.042 0.026 0.328 0.029 0.021 0.047 0.017 0.019 -0.022 0.019 0.015 0.334 0.014 0.016 0.009 0.010 0.005 0.052 0.008 0.007 0.222 0.003 0.003 0.131 
Nace division 64 0.015 0.018 0.025 0.031 0.031 0.125 0.008 0.010 0.059 0.054 0.079 -0.020 0.019 0.017 0.304 0.010 0.012 -0.022 0.039 0.020 -0.038 0.034 0.059 0.145 0.030 0.069 0.127 
Nace division 65 0.008 0.016 0.423 0.010 0.022 0.355 0.055 0.069 0.315 0.035 0.074 -0.089 0.093 0.129 0.320 0.038 0.032 0.181 0.036 0.030 0.138 0.017 0.047 0.056 0.009 0.025 0.548 
Nace division 66 0.004 0.007 0.232 0.003 0.006 0.239 0.013 0.020 0.189 0.012 0.022 -0.121 0.004 0.004 0.373 0.009 0.014 0.094 0.016 0.010 0.090 0.005 0.013 0.110 0.008 0.008 0.216 
Nace division 67 0.001 0.001 -0.056 0.002 0.002 0.470 0.004 0.016 0.091 0.006 0.008 0.150 0.003 0.005 0.389 0.001 0.003 0.105 0.002 0.002 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.553 0.000 0.000 0.456 
Nace division 70 0.013 0.011 0.086 0.038 0.056 0.177 0.006 0.008 0.029 0.007 0.009 -0.029 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.002 0.003 0.079 0.006 0.004 0.099 0.010 0.005 0.094 0.005 0.003 0.221 
Nace division 71 0.001 0.000 0.155 0.003 0.003 0.529 0.005 0.004 0.027 0.005 0.003 -0.021 0.011 0.008 0.053 0.003 0.001 -0.076 0.002 0.001 -0.064 0.000 0.000 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.109 
Nace division 72 0.005 0.003 0.118 0.012 0.008 0.182 0.022 0.030 0.026 0.036 0.025 0.031 0.013 0.011 0.091 0.005 0.005 -0.133 0.019 0.003 -0.025 0.001 0.001 -0.059 0.006 0.002 0.613 
Nace division 73 0.007 0.008 -0.403 0.008 0.012 -0.790 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.009 -0.202 0.002 0.004 0.145 0.001 0.001 -0.223 0.009 0.003 -0.025 0.005 0.007 -0.139 0.009 0.010 -0.001 
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Nace division 74 0.026 0.022 0.015 0.044 0.046 0.147 0.050 0.110 -0.144 0.054 0.081 -0.047 0.029 0.059 0.167 0.054 0.123 -0.089 0.084 0.081 -0.015 0.032 0.026 -0.090 0.014 0.014 0.033 
Nace division 75 0.099 0.079 0.009 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000  0.169 0.095 0.077 0.034 0.087 0.035 0.014 0.045 -0.018 
Nace division 80 0.087 0.265 -0.350 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.031 0.088 -0.162 0.113 0.147 0.021 0.022 0.038 -0.264 0.021 0.053 -0.137 
Nace division 85 0.037 0.153 -0.261 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.030 0.136 -0.147 0.088 0.403 0.064 0.033 0.175 0.043 0.045 0.213 -0.037 
Nace division 90 0.021 0.007 0.039 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.010 0.005 0.081 0.006 0.002 0.070 0.013 0.004 0.051 0.006 0.002 0.076 
Nace division 91 0.002 0.002 0.146 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.006 0.017 -0.140 0.010 0.007 -0.031 0.000 0.000 -0.136 0.002 0.000 -0.580 
Nace division 92 0.021 0.028 -0.292 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.021 0.026 -0.022 0.008 0.008 0.040 0.011 0.014 -0.160 0.004 0.004 -0.011 
Nace division 93 0.002 0.005 -0.068 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.004 0.011 -0.157 0.001 0.002 -0.056 0.000 0.001 0.065 0.005 0.004 0.109 
Share of females  0.355 0.696 -0.190 0.306 0.600 -0.134 0.224 0.518 -0.158 0.259 0.549 -0.118 0.233 0.620 -0.156 0.216 0.604 -0.239 0.331 0.677 -0.154 0.338 0.611 -0.431 0.356 0.584 -0.439 
Average age 40.468 41.029 -0.009 39.694 39.159 -0.009 39.595 38.482 0.000 39.765 38.157 0.003 38.350 36.613 0.003 37.962 36.960 0.003 40.029 38.969 0.000 41.326 40.359 -0.018 39.992 39.686 -0.018 
Average tenure  6.562 7.809 0.007 3.819 3.812 0.022 11.593 10.563 0.002 7.725 6.799 -0.003 9.876 8.951 -0.003 8.336 6.826 0.003 8.749 6.642 0.002 11.329 9.250 -0.005 11.580 10.723 -0.004 
Share high-educated workers 0.363 0.446 0.312 0.219 0.223 0.866 0.090 0.096 0.087 0.203 0.204 0.264 0.102 0.107 0.237 0.265 0.317 0.114 0.298 0.297 0.033 0.153 0.182 0.523 0.180 0.206 0.206 
Share  low-educated workers 0.075 0.055 0.067 0.117 0.092 0.126 0.489 0.461 -0.072 0.145 0.152 -0.098 0.701 0.674 -0.183 0.570 0.495 -0.098 0.267 0.251 -0.130 0.113 0.120 -0.105 0.084 0.098 -0.092 
Adjusted R2 0.488 0.390 0.547 0.619 0.695 0.568 0.620 0.587 0.530 
Number of observations 63,214 74,019 - 100,748 77,143 - 55,187 25,693 - 359,508206,863 - 35,998 22,051 - 138,950 75,961 - 38,579 39,363  520,605452,124 - 211,478180,851 - 
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 Gender hourly 
wage ratio 
Gender log  
hourly wage gap 
Slovakia 72.0 0.329 
Iceland 72.7 0.319 
United Kingdom  72.8 0.317 
Estonia 73.3 0.311 
Austria 73.6 0.306 
EU-25 74.4 0.296 
Germany 74.4 0.296 
EU-15 76.8 0.265 
Czech Republic 78.8 0.238 
Latvia 79.3 0.232 
Spain 79.8 0.226 
Denmark 80.0 0.223 
Norway 80.2 0.221 
Luxembourg 81.1 0.210 
Italy 81.1 0.209 
Netherlands 81.2 0.208 
Bulgaria 81.8 0.201 
Finland 82.0 0.199 
Hungary 82.6 0.191 
Belgium 82.9 0.188 
France 83.4 0.181 
Romania 84.1 0.174 
Ireland 84.2 0.172 
Sweden 84.7 0.166 
NMS-10 85.4 0.157 
Lithuania 87.2 0.136 
Poland 92.7 0.076 
Slovenia 94.9 0.052 
 
 
